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ABSTRACT Intelligent Agents act in open and thus risky environments, hence making the 
appropriate decision about who to trust in order to interact with, could be a challenging process. 
As intelligent agents are gradually enriched with Semantic Web technology, acting on behalf of 
their users with limited or no human intervention, their ability to perform assigned tasks is 
scrutinized. Hence, trust and reputation models, based on interaction trust or witness reputation, 
have been proposed, yet they often presuppose the use of a centralized authority. Although such 
mechanisms are more popular, they are usually faced with skepticism, since users may question 
the trustworthiness and the robustness of a central authority. Distributed models, on the other 
hand, are more complex but they provide personalized estimations based on each agent’s interests 
and preferences. To this end, this article proposes DISARM, a novel distributed reputation 
model. DISARM deals MASs as social networks, enabling agents to establish and maintain 
relationships, limiting the disadvantages of the common distributed approaches. Additionally, it 
is based on defeasible logic, modeling the way intelligent agents, like humans, draw reasonable 
conclusions from incomplete and possibly conflicting (thus inconclusive) information. Finally, 
we provide an evaluation that illustrates the usability of the proposed model. 
 
Keywords: Semantic Web, Intelligent Multi-agent Systems, Agent Reputation, Defeasible 
Reasoning. 
1 Introduction 
Intelligent Agents (IAs) act in open and thus risky environments, hence making the appropriate 
decision about the degree of trust that can be invested in a certain partner is vital yet really 
challenging [41]. Over the last few years, scientific research in this field has significantly 
increased. Most researchers tend to consider trust and reputation as key elements in the design 
and implementation of modern multi-agent systems (MASs). However, there is still no single, 
accepted definition of trust within the research community, although it is generally defined as the 
expectation of competence and willingness to perform a given task. Broadly speaking, trust has 
been defined in a number of ways in the literature, depending on the domain of use. Among these 
definitions, there is one that can be used as a reference point for understanding trust, provided by 
Dasgupta [12]. According to Dasgupta, trust is a belief an agent has that the other party will do 
what it says it will (being honest and reliable) or reciprocate (being reciprocative for the common 
good of both), given an opportunity to defect to get higher payoffs. 
 Trust, however, is much more than that; the uncertainties found in the modern MASs 
present a number of new challenges. More specifically, MASs are open distributed systems, 
sometimes large-scaled, which mean that the agents represent different stakeholders that are 
likely to be self-interested and might not always complete tasks requested from them. Moreover, 
given that the system is open, usually no central authority can control all the agents, which mean 
that agents can join and leave at any time. The problem is that this allows agents to change their 
identity and re-enter, avoiding punishment for any past wrong doing. One, more, risky feature of 
open systems is that when an agent first enters the system has no information about the other 
agents in that environment. Given this, the agent is likely to be faced with a large amount of 
possible partners with a different degree of efficiency and/or effectiveness. 
 To this end, a number of researchers were motivated by the understanding that some 
individuals, and thus their agents, may be dishonest, focusing eventually their efforts on agents’ 
reputation. In general, reputation is the opinion of the public towards an agent. Reputation allows 
agents to build trust, or the degree to which one agent has confidence in another agent, helping 
them to establish relationships that achieve mutual benefits. Hence, reputation (trust) models help 
agents to decide who to trust, encouraging trustworthy behavior and deterring dishonest 
participation by providing the mean through which reputation and ultimately trust can be 
quantified [43]. Hence, as intelligent agents are gradually enriched with Semantic Web 
technology [18, 6, 5], acting on behalf of their users with limited or no human intervention, their 
ability to perform assigned tasks is scrutinized. To this end, plenty of trust and reputation models 
have been proposed in different perspectives, yet they often presuppose the use of a centralized 
authority [41]. Although such reputation mechanisms are more popular, they are usually faced 
with skepticism, since in open MASs agents represent different owners, who may question the 
trustworthiness and the robustness of a central authority. 
 On the other hand, distributed reputation models are typically more complex and require a 
lot of communication in order agents to exchange their ratings. These models have no centralized 
system manager; hence each agent has to overcome the difficulty of locating ratings and develop 
somehow a subjective estimation by itself using its own resources. No global or public reputation 
exists. The reputation built in this way is thus personalized and sometimes difficult to reach. 
However, a distributed reputation system is more flexible in building agents’ reputation, since it 
is quite easy for an agent to develop differentiated trust in other agents based on its interests and 
purposes. Yet, beyond the traditional choice of centralized or distributed approach, there is an 
even more challenging decision; what should be taken into account in order to estimate the 
reputation of an agent, interaction trust or witness reputation [2, 32]. In other words, an agent’s 
direct experience or reports provided by others, respectively. 
 Broadly speaking, both approaches have limitations. For instance, if the reputation 
estimation is based only on direct experience, it would require a long time for an agent to reach a 
satisfying estimation level. This is because, when an agent enters an environment for the first 
time, it has no history of interactions with the other agents in the environment. Thus, it needs a 
long time to reach a sufficient amount of interactions that could lead to sufficient information. On 
the other hand, models based only on witness reports could not guarantee reliable estimation as 
self-interested agents could be unwilling or unable to sacrifice their resources in order to provide 
reports. Hence, models based only on one or the other approach typically cannot guarantee stable 
and reliable estimations. To this end, in order to overcome these drawbacks, a number of hybrid 
models that combine both interaction trust and witness reputation were proposed [2, 20, 21, 32]. 
However, most of hybrid models either have fixed proportion of their active participation in the 
final estimation or leave the choice to the final user. Although these approaches have significant 
advantages, sometimes they may lead to misleading estimations. Users may have little or no 
experience and thus take wrong decisions that could lead to wrong assessments, whereas fixed 
values provide just generic estimations. Our goal is not to estrange the users from the decision 
making process, but to help them, and their agents, to make better decisions. 
 To this end, this article proposes a novel distributed reputation model, called DISARM, 
that combines both interaction trust and witness reputation. DISARM is a knowledge-based 
approach, based on well-established estimation parameters [8, 9, 16, 19, 22, 49, 48], that provides 
a more intuitive method for non-technical users. More specifically, its intention is to reduce the 
disadvantages of the common distributed hybrid approaches, such as the difficulty in locating 
ratings, and provide a mechanism for modeling the way intelligent agents, like humans, draw 
reasonable conclusions from incomplete and possibly conflicting (thus inconclusive) information. 
This is achieved by designing and implementing a reputation mechanism based on social 
principles and defeasible logic. Concerning the social aspect of the model, DISARM proposes an 
approach where agents are enabled to establish, through their interactions, and maintain 
relationships, much as individual do in real life. More specifically, DISARM considers agents 
acting in the environment as a social network which determines the proximity relationships 
among them. In this context, all known agents create a network, which is expanded whenever 
new agent interactions take place in the environment. The advantage of this approach is that it 
allows agents to communicate with previously known and well-rated agents, locating, quite fast, 
ratings with small bandwidth cost.  
Concerning the modeling mechanism, although it is logic-independent, DISARM 
proposes the use of defeasible logic, a logic that has the notion of rules that can be defeated, 
allowing an existing belief to turn false, making it nonmonotonic [35, 39]. In a fundamental 
sense, nonmonotonic logics occupy undoubtedly prominent position among the disciplines 
investigating intelligent reasoning about complex and dynamic situations. Thus, permitting 
agents to arrive at defeasible conclusions, leads to more realistic assessments similar to human 
reasoning. Additionally, defeasible logic is part of a more general area of research, defeasible 
reasoning, which is notable for its low computational complexity [31]. 
 Moreover, we provide an evaluation that illustrates the usability of the proposed model. 
The rest of the article is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present a brief overview of 
defeasible logic. Section 3 presents DISARM and its contribution. In Section 4, DISARM’s 
evaluation is presented, demonstrating the added value of the approach. Section 5 discusses 
related work, and Section 6 concludes with final remarks and directions for future work. 
2 Defeasible logic 
Defeasible logic (DL), introduced by Nute [34, 36] with a particular concern about efficiency and 
implementation, is part of a more general area of research, defeasible reasoning [39, 38]. Over the 
years the logic has been developed and extended while several variants have been proposed. Yet, 
DL remains a simple and efficient rule based nonmonotonic formalism that deals with incomplete 
and conflicting information. More specifically, DL has the notion of rules that can be defeated; 
hence it derives plausible conclusions from partial and sometimes conflicting information. These 
conclusions, despite being supported by the currently available information, could nonetheless be 
rejected in the light of new, or more refined, information.  
 Compared to other more mainstream nonmonotonic approaches, e.g. [42, 13], this 
approach offers among others enhanced representational capabilities and low computational 
complexity. Moreover, DL in contrast with traditional deductive logic, allows the addition of 
further propositions to make an existing belief false, making it nonmonotonic [26]. In a 
fundamental sense, nonmonotonic logics occupy undoubtedly prominent position among the 
disciplines investigating intelligent reasoning about complex and dynamic situations / 
environments. Hence, one of the main interests in DL is in the area of agents [14]. DL, being a 
nonmonotonic logic, is capable of modeling the way intelligent agents, like humans, draw 
reasonable conclusions from inconclusive information, leading to more realistic conclusions and 
assessments similar to human reasoning. 
Knowledge in DL is represented in terms of facts, rules and superiority relations. Facts 
are indisputable statements, represented either in form of states of affairs (literal and modal 
literal) or actions that have been performed. Rules describe the relationship between a set of 
literals (premises) and a literal (conclusion). Rules are divided into strict rules, defeasible rules 
and defeaters. Strict rules are rules in the classical sense, whenever the premises are indisputable, 
e.g. facts, then so is the conclusion. Thus, they can be used for definitional clauses. Defeasible 
rules, on the other hand, are rules that can be defeated by contrary evidence. Defeaters are rules 
that cannot be used to draw any conclusions. Their only use is to prevent some conclusions. The 
form of rules, in symbolic and d-POSL syntax [25], are presented in Table 1. Finally, the 
superiority relation is a binary relation defined over the set of rules, which determines the relative 
strength of two (conflicting) rules, i.e. rules that infer conflicting literals.  
Table 1. Rules in Defeasible Logic.  
RULE TYPE RULE FORM D-POSL SYNTAX 
STRICT RULES A1, … , An → B B:-A1, … , An 
DEFEASIBLE RULES A1, … , An => B B:=A1, … , An 
DEFEATERS A1, … , An ~> B B:~A1, … , An 
 
  The main concept in DL is that it does not support contradictory conclusions, but 
it tries to resolve conflicts. Hence, in cases where there is some support for concluding A, but 
there is also support for concluding ¬A, no conclusion is derived unless one of the two rules that 
support these conflicting conclusions has priority over the other. This priority is expressed 
through a superiority relation among rules which defines priorities among them, namely where 
one rule may override the conclusion of another rule. Yet, conclusions can be classified as 
definite or defeasible. A definite conclusion is a conclusion that cannot be withdrawn when new 
information is available. A defeasible conclusion, on the other hand, is a tentative conclusion that 
might be withdrawn in the future. In addition, the logic is able to tell whether a conclusion is or is 
not provable, hence there are four possible types of conclusions; positive definite, negative 
definite, positive defeasible and negative defeasible.  
 Positive definite conclusions are provable using only facts and strict rules while negative 
definite conclusions are not provable by using these. Positive defeasible conclusions can be 
defeasible proved, while negative defeasible conclusions are not even defeasibly provable. Strict 
derivations are obtained by forward chaining of strict rules, while a defeasible conclusion A can 
be derived if there is a rule whose conclusion is A, whose premises have either already been 
proved or given in the form of facts and any stronger rule whose conclusion is ¬A (the negation 
of A) has premises that fail to be derived or the latter rule has been defeated by an even stronger 
rule. In this context, a special case of conflict is between different positive literals, all derived by 
different defeasible rules, whereas only one should be derived. “Conflicting literals” are defined 
through a conflict set and the conflict is resolved through superiorities. [7] 
3 DISARM 
The proposed model is called DISARM and it is a distributed, hybrid, rule-based reputation 
model. DISARM uses defeasible logic in order to combine in a practical way all available ratings, 
both those based on the agent’s personal experience and those provided by known and/or 
unknown third parties. This model aims not only at reducing the disadvantages of the common 
distributed approaches, such as the difficulty in locating ratings, but mainly it aims at improving 
the performance of the hybrid approach by providing an intuitive decision making mechanism. 
DISARM aims at providing a distributed mechanism based on defeasible logic that would be able 
to model the way humans think, infer and decide.  
3.1 Main principles of the DISARM Model 
For purposes of better understanding, we present here the main principles of our model. First of 
all, DISARM has no centralized authority since it is a distributed model. Hence, it is each agent’s 
responsibility to locate ratings and use the model. In this context, even if more than one agents 
have available the same ratings, they probably will come out with different estimations and as a 
result they will take different decisions.  
 Time, evolution over time in particular, is an important issue since it reflects the behavior 
of an agent. More specifically, in dynamic environments such as MASs, agents may change their 
objectives at any time. For instance, a typical dishonest agent could provide quality services over 
a period to gain a high reputation score, and then, profiting from that high score could provide 
low quality services. Hence, time should be and it is taken into account in the proposed model. 
Yet, DISARM allows agents to decide on their own about what they consider important. To this 
end, it is up to each agent’s strategy to determine the value of time. Agents could take into 
account all the available ratings or only the latest; e.g. those referred to last week, last month or 
last year.  
 Taking into account the latest ratings leads undoubtedly to an up-to-date overview, 
however it could be misleading. For instance, in this limited time period, a typical dishonest 
agent could temporary improve its behavior or, on the other hand, a typical reliable agent, facing 
a problem, could temporary act faulty, transformed into a mercenary and malicious agent. Hence, 
it is a risk to take into account only part of the available ratings, although there is sometimes 
significant gain in time and computational cost. In contrary, taking into account all available 
ratings leads to an overview of an agent’s behavior history but it costs in terms of storage space, 
execution time and computational power. 
 DISARM, however, is a distributed model which means that locating ratings is a quite 
challenging process. The rating records could be always there but usually they are unreachable 
since various agents may join or leave the system at any time. For instance, sometimes only a few 
ratings are available; e.g. personal experience could be missing and/or appropriate witnesses 
could be difficult to locate. On the other hand, sometimes there is a large amount of available 
ratings but taking all of them into account has significant computational cost. Moreover, these 
ratings may significantly differ. In this context, DISARM integrates an indication of how likely is 
the assessment to be proved correct based on the variability of ratings that were taken into 
account. In other words, DISARM allows agents to be informed about the possibility of wrong 
estimation and loss. 
 Another important issue that DISARM deals with is the trust relationships that agents 
build and maintain over time, much as individuals do in real world. For instance, if an agent is 
satisfied with a partner, probably it will prefer to interact again with that partner in the future. On 
the other hand, if it is disappointed by a partner, it will avoid interacting again with that partner. 
To this end, DISARM proposes the use of two lists, called white-list and black-list. Each agent 
stores in its white-list the names of its favored partners while in its black-list it stores those that 
should be avoided. The decision about who will be added in each list is taken by the agent itself. 
More specifically, each agent is equipped with a rule-based decision-making logic which enables 
it to decide upon its partners, adding them, if necessary, to the appropriate list. Hence, it will be 
easy for the agent to locate a well-known old partner that will do the job and at the same time 
avoid a fraud. Moreover, a user is much more likely to believe statements from a trusted 
acquaintance than from a previously known dishonest agent or a stranger. 
 Finally, additionally to the difficulty to locate ratings is the difficulty to locate really 
useful ratings. For instance, sometimes agents are involved in important and crucial for them 
interactions whereas sometimes they are involved in simple interactions of minor importance. 
Hence, the question is which of them should be taken into account in order to get a representative 
estimation. To this end, DISARM adopts the use of two more parameters for each rating; namely 
importance and confidence. Importance indicates how critical the transaction was for the rating 
agent while confidence gives an estimation of the agent’s certainty for that rating. 
3.2 Rating parameters 
Taking into account the proper parameters for an assessment is a really challenging task. They 
should be carefully chosen in order to reflect the agents’ abilities. Besides, an efficient decision 
making mechanism has to rely on carefully selected data and a straightforward and efficient 
rating procedure. Although, a thorough overview of related literature is out of the scope of this 
article, we tried to catch out parameters, or factors for others, that are usually referred either 
explicitly or implicitly in reputation models and metrics, e.g. [8, 9, 16, 19, 22, 49, 48]. To this 
end, DISARM uses for its needs six properties; namely response time, validity, completeness, 
correctness, cooperation and outcome feeling. 
Response time refers to the time that an agent needs in order to complete the tasks that it 
is responsible for. Time is the only parameter that is always taken into account in the literature. 
Validity describes the degree that an agent is sincere and credible. An agent is sincere when it 
believes what it says, whereas it is credible when what it believes is true in the world. Hence, an 
agent is valid if it is both. Validity is not always such called, yet in most cases there are 
parameters that attempt to indicate how sincere and/or credible an agent is. Completeness, on the 
other hand, describes the degree that an agent says what it believes while what it believes is true 
in the world. In other words, completeness is the inverse of validity, indicating how honest and 
realistic an agent is. Completeness is usually implicitly referred, as an attempt to rate dishonest 
and fraud behavior.  
Moreover, correctness refers to an agent’s providing services. An agent is correct if its 
provided service is correct with respect to a specification. Correctness, no matter how it is called, 
is, actually, the second most used parameter after time. Cooperation is the willingness of an agent 
who is being helpful by doing what is wanted or asked for. Cooperation is not, usually, handled 
as separate parameter, however, it is an important task in distributed social environments, such as 
MASs. Finally, the outcome feeling is a general feeling of satisfaction or dissatisfaction related to 
the transaction outcome; namely it indicates if the transaction was easy and pleasant with a 
satisfying result or not. Usually, it is referred as the degree of request fulfillment.   
However, although these six parameters are, usually, taken into account in one way or 
another, they are not necessarily binding. Some of them could be replaced by other more domain-
specific parameters depending on the domain of use, e.g. agents acting in E-Commerce 
transactions. Yet, our intention, here, in the context of DISARM, is to provide general purpose 
parameters that will be able to reflect the common critical characteristics of each agent in the 
community. In other words, DISARM takes into account parameters that can provide an 
overview of each agent’s behavior. Hence, consider an agent A establishing an interaction with 
an agent X; agent A can evaluate the other agent’s performance and thus affect its reputation. The 
evaluating agent (A) is called truster whereas the evaluated agent (X) is called trustee. Of course, 
for some interactions an agent can be both truster and trustee, since it can evaluate its partner 
while it is evaluated by that partner at the same time. After each interaction in the environment, 
the truster has to evaluate the abilities of the trustee in terms of response time, validity, 
completeness, correctness, cooperation and outcome feeling. DISARM, however, is a distributed 
model hence truster does not have to report its ratings but just to save them for future use.  
 Yet, in order to remember how important was the transaction for it and how confident it 
was for its rating, the agent has to associate two more values to the rating, as was already 
discussed, namely confidence and importance. Additionally, since time is considered an 
important aspect in DISARM’s decision making process, each rating is associated with a time 
stamp (t), e.g. in the form YYMMDDHHMMSS or YYMMDD or HHMMSS or it can be 
represented even as an integer in case of experimental simulations, indicating the transaction’s 
time point. Hence, taking the above into account the truster’s rating value (r) in DISARM is a 
tuple with eleven elements: (truster, trustee, t, response time, validity, completeness, correctness, 
cooperation, outcome feeling, confidence, transaction value). Notice, that although each truster 
agent stores its own ratings, we include the variable truster in the rating value. This is because the 
truster may forward its ratings to other agents; hence, these agents should be able to identify the 
rating agent for each rating they receive. In DISARM, the rating values vary from 0.1 (terrible) to 
10 (perfect); r ∈ [0.1, 10], except confidence and transaction values that vary from 0 (0%) to 1 
(100%).  
3.3 Rule-based decision mechanism 
Defining the rating values is the first step towards an efficient reputation model, the core of the 
approach, however, is its decision making mechanism. The distributed reputation models have 
invariably to deal with a range of complex issues related to the decision making process, such as 
locating ratings. Hence, DISARM aims at providing a trust estimation procedure much as 
individuals do in real world, where they build and maintain trust relationships over time. To this 
end, DISARM simulates their decision making process, proposing a set of strict and defeasible 
rules, in a practical, intuitive approach.  
3.3.1 Rating procedure 
First of all, as soon as, an interaction ends each agent evaluates its partner in terms of response 
time, validity, completeness, correctness, cooperation and outcome feeling. Then it adds its 
confidence and a value indicating the importance of the transaction (transaction value). When all 
values are got together, the rating agent (truster) adds its name, the trustee’s name and the current 
time point (t), forming the final rating value (r) as a tuple with eleven elements. This tuple is 
presented below in the compact d-POSL syntax [25] of defeasible RuleML [3]. A syntax that will 
be used throughout this article in order to express in a compact way the data (ratings) and rules 
(strict and defeasible rules used in the decision making process) of our approach. To this end, the 
truster’s rating (r) is the fact:  
rating(id→rating’s_id, truster→truster’s_name, trustee→trustee’s_name, t→time_stamp, 
response_time→value1, validity→value2, completeness→value3, 
 correctness→value4, cooperation→value5, outcome_feeling→value6,  
confidence→value7, transaction_value→value8).  
Additionally, an example rating provided by agent (A) truster for the agent (X) trustee could be:  
rating(id→1, truster→A, trustee→X, t→140630105632, response_time→9, validity→7,  
completeness→6, correctness→6, cooperation→8,  
outcome_feeling→7, confidence→0.9, transaction_value→0.8). 
Next, truster stores this rating to its repository. However, as already mentioned, agents 
compliant with DISARM use two lists, additionally to their rating repository; white-list and 
black-list. More specifically, these lists are two separate repositories, one for storing promising 
partners (white-list) and one for those partners that should be avoided (black-list). Hence, truster 
has also to decide whether it should add the trustee to its white (or black) list or not. Obviously, 
the decision is based on what it is considered as a promising (or terrible on the other hand) 
partner. Promising is a partner if it acts responsibly and it provides high quality services or 
products. A partner is responsible if it is cooperative, responds fast and leaves a positive feeling 
at the end of the transaction.  
Of course, each agent has a different degree of tolerance, thus, what may be fast for an 
agent could be slow for another. Hence, each agent has some thresholds that determine the lowest 
accepted value for each parameter; namely response time, validity, completeness, correctness, 
cooperation and outcome feeling. Moreover, from each agent’s perspective a parameter could be 
more important than others. For instance, an agent could consider response time the most 
important aspect, perhaps not the only, in deciding whether its partner could be characterized 
good or bad. Hence, truster classifies its partner in relation to a reason, e.g. response time. In this 
context, rule r1, presented below, indicates that if all values are higher than the truster’s associate 
thresholds then the trustee’s behavior is considered good. 
r1: good_behavior(time → ?t, truster→ ?a, trustee→ ?x, reason → response_time) :-  
  response_time_threshold(?resp), validity_threshold(?val),  
  completeness_threshold(?com), correctness_threshold(?cor),  
  cooperation_threshold(?coop), outcome_feeling_threshold(?outf),  
  rating(id→?idx, time → ?t, truster→ ?a, trustee→ ?x,  
   response_time→?respx, validity→?valx, completeness→?comx,  
   correctness→?corx, cooperation→?coopx, outcome_feeling→?outfx),  
  ?respx>?resp, ?valx>?val, ?comx>?com, ?corx>?cor,  
  ?coopx>?coop, ?outfx>?outf. 
Where response_time (reason) could be replaced by one of the rest parameters, namely 
validity, completeness, correctness, cooperation and outcome_feeling. On the other hand, 
trustee’s behavior is consider disappointing and, thus, bad in relation to a reason/parameter, if 
trustee’s rate for this parameter is lower than the truster’s thresholds. Rules r2 to r7 present the 
group of rules that characterize the behavior of an agent as bad depending on a specific reason. 
r2: bad_behavior(time → ?t, truster→ ?a, trustee→ ?x, reason → response_time) :-  
  rating(id→?idx, time → ?t, truster→ ?a, trustee→ ?x, response_time→?respx),  
  response_time_threshold(?resp),  
  ?respx<=?resp. 
r3: bad_behavior(time → ?t, truster→ ?a, trustee→ ?x, reason → validity):-  
  rating(id→?idx, time → ?t, truster→ ?a, trustee→ ?x, validity→?valx),  
  validity_threshold(?val), 
  ?valx<=?val. 
r4: bad_behavior(time → ?t, truster→ ?a, trustee→ ?x, reason→ completeness) :-  
  rating(id→?idx, time → ?t, truster→ ?a, trustee→ ?x, completeness→?comx),  
  completeness_threshold(?com),  
  ?comx<=?com. 
r5: bad_behavior(time → ?t, truster→ ?a, trustee→ ?x, reason→ correctness):-  
  rating(id→?idx, time → ?t, truster→ ?a, trustee→ ?x, correctness→? corx),  
  correctness_threshold(?cor), 
  ?corx<=?cor. 
r6: bad_behavior(time → ?t, truster→ ?a, trustee→ ?x, reason→ cooperation) :-  
  rating(id→?idx, time → ?t, truster→ ?a, trustee→ ?x, cooperation→?coopx),  
  cooperation_threshold(?coop),  
  ?coopx<=?coop. 
r7: bad_behavior(time → ?t, truster→ ?a, trustee→ ?x, reason → outcome_feeling):-  
  rating(id→?idx, time → ?t, truster→ ?a, trustee→ ?x, outcome_feeling→?outfx),  
  outcome_feeling_threshold(?outf), 
  ?outfx<=?outf. 
However, characterizing a trustee’s behavior good or bad does not, necessary, mean that 
this trustee will be added to the truster’s white or black list, respectively. This decision is left to 
the truster’s private strategy and it could vary greatly from agent to agent. For instance, a truster 
could be lenient and, thus, it might add quite easily trustees to its white-list. Another truster might 
expect to see good behavior several times either for the same reason (r8, where ?self represents 
the truster itself) or for a number of reasons (r9), before adding a trustee to its white-list. 
Similarly, a truster might expect to face a trustee’s bad behavior more than one times either for 
the same reason (r10) or for a number of reasons (r11), before adding the trustee to its black-list. 
Hence, a strict truster would easily add trustees to its black-list but not to its white-list whereas a 
lenient would give more changes before adding a trustee to its own black-list.  
r8: add_whitelist(trustee→ ?x, time → ?t3) := 
  good_behavior(time → ?t1, truster→ ?self, trustee→ ?x, reason → ?r), 
  good_behavior(time → ?t2, truster→ ?self, trustee→ ?x, reason → ?r), 
  good_behavior(time → ?t3, truster→ ?self, trustee→ ?x, reason → ?r), 
  ?t2 > ?t1, ?t3 > ?t2. 
r9: add_whitelist(trustee→ ?x, time → ?t3) := 
  good_behavior(time → ?t1, truster→ ?self, trustee→ ?x, reason → ?r1), 
  good_behavior(time → ?t2, truster→ ?self, trustee→ ?x, reason → ?r2), 
  good_behavior(time → ?t3, truster→ ?self, trustee→ ?x, reason → ?r3), 
  ?t2 > ?t1, ?t3 > ?t2. 
r10: add_blacklist(trustee→ ?x, time → ?t2) := 
 bad_behavior(time → ?t1, truster→ ?self, trustee→ ?x, reason → ?r), 
 bad_behavior(time → ?t2, truster→ ?self, trustee→ ?x, reason → ?r), 
 ?t2 > ?t1. 
r11: add_blacklist(trustee→ ?x, time → ?t3) := 
 bad_behavior(time → ?t1, truster→ ?self, trustee→ ?x, reason → ?r1), 
 bad_behavior(time → ?t2, truster→ ?self, trustee→ ?x, reason → ?r2), 
 bad_behavior(time → ?t3, truster→ ?self, trustee→ ?x, reason → ?r3), 
 ?t2 > ?t1, ?t3 > ?t2, ?r2 ≠ ?r1, ?r3 ≠ ?r2, ?r3 ≠ ?r1. 
Mention that the above rules are defeasible since they are part of the truster’s preferences 
(private strategy). The priority relationship among them could vary from case to case and it is left 
to the truster. Other theories could, also, be used depending on the requirements and preferences 
a truster, its user in particular, has. Next, as soon as, the truster decides upon who should be 
added to the white-list and/or the black-list, it proceeds to the next part of rules (r12 - r15) where 
the addition is, actually, carried out.  
 r12: blacklist(trustee→ ?x, time → ?t) := 
  ¬whitelist(trustee→ ?x, time → ?t1), 
  add_blacklist(trustee→ ?x, time → ?t2), 
  ?t2 > ?t1. 
r13: ¬blacklist(trustee→ ?x, time → ?t2) := 
  blacklist(trustee→ ?x, time → ?t1), 
  add_whitelist(trustee→ ?x, time → ?t2), 
  ?t2 > ?t1. 
r14: whitelist(trustee→ ?x, time → ?t) := 
  ¬blacklist(trustee→ ?x, time → ?t1), 
  add_whitelist(trustee→ ?x, time → ?t2), 
  ?t2 > ?t1. 
r15: ¬whitelist(trustee→ ?x, time → ?t2) := 
  whitelist(trustee→ ?x, time → ?t1), 
  add_blacklist(trustee→ ?x, time → ?t2), 
  ?t2 > ?t1. 
As a result, the truster’s white-list, WLA ≡ {Xi, … Xn}, finally, includes the names 
(?x → Xi) of all its favored agents (r16 - r17) whereas its black-list, BLA ≡ {Xj, … Xm}, 
includes the agents that it would prefer to avoid (r18 - r19). 
r16: WL(trustee→ ?x) := 
  whitelist(trustee→ ?x, time → ?t1), 
  not(¬whitelist(trustee→ ?x, time → ?t2), ?t2 > ?t1)). 
r17: ¬WL(trustee→ ?x) :~ 
  ¬whitelist(trustee→ ?x, time → ?t1), 
  not(whitelist(trustee→ ?x, time → ?t2), ?t2 > ?t1)). 
r18: BL(trustee→ ?x) := 
  blacklist(trustee→ ?x, time → ?t1), 
  not(¬blacklist(trustee→ ?x, time → ?t2), ?t2 > ?t1)). 
r19: ¬BL(trustee→ ?x) :~ 
  ¬blacklist(trustee→ ?x, time → ?t1), 
  not(blacklist(trustee→ ?x, time → ?t2), ?t2 > ?t1)). 
3.3.2 Locating ratings 
A major challenge for open distributed and sometimes large-scaled (multi-agent) systems is how 
to locate ratings among the rest of the community. The simplest and most common approach in 
such a distributed environment is to send a request message [50, 23]. Yet, the question is how and 
to whom this message should be sent directly and probably propagated by the direct and indirect 
receivers. To this end, using as a guide research on peer-to-peer networks [1], there are two core 
ways to propagate messages in order to locate peers (or ratings in our case) [33]. The first 
approach assigns a maximum time-to-live (TTL) parameter to each request message hence the 
requesting peer sends the message to its neighbors, who relay it to their own neighbors and so on 
until the time-to-live value is reached. The second approach allows peers to relay the message 
only to one neighbor at time, since they have to wait the response from a neighbor before forward 
the message to another neighbor. The first approach increases the communication cost, leading to 
significant higher bandwidth consumption but partners (and so ratings) are located fast. On the 
other hand, the second approach requires low bandwidth but it leads to time delays since more 
time is required to get feedback for the requests.  
 Over the last years, a number of researchers have proposed approaches that try to reduce 
bandwidth or improve response time (e.g. [30, 40]), mainly focusing on how to reach good and 
far away peers. Although, it is out of the scope of this article to research or improve peer-to-peer 
message propagate protocols, we were inspired by these approaches. To this end, DISARM, 
proposes a more intuitive approach where agents take advantage of their previously established 
relationships in order to propagate their new requests, finding, quite fast, ratings with small 
bandwidth cost. More specifically, although the notion of neighbors does not exist in MASs, 
agents can use previously known partners in a similar point of view. To this end, in DISARM 
MASs are considered as social networks of agents. Such a social network can actually be 
represented by a social graph; a graph based on previously known agents either good (white-list) 
or bad (black-list). Hence, the known agents of an agent are, in our point of view, its neighbors. 
Using the knowledge represented by the social graph, DISARM is able to determine the 
proximity relationships among agents in the environment. In this context, it is easier for an agent 
to propagate its requests and eventually locate appropriate ratings.  
Hence, an agent A that wants to collect ratings referred to agent X, does not send a 
request message to all agents but only to those stored in its white-list. The motivation behind this 
action is the fact that a user is much more likely to believe statements from a trusted acquaintance 
than from a previously known dishonest agent or a stranger. Yet, these previously known and 
well behaved agents may have no interaction history with agent X. This could lead to limited or 
zero feedback for the requesting agent A. To this end, adopting the notion of TTL, in DISARM 
each ratings request message is accompanied with a TTL value, where TTL represents the hops 
in the graph. Hence, each request is characterized by its horizon (TTL value) that determines how 
far the message will be propagated in the environment. In other words, the requesting agent 
determines if it is allowed (TTL ≠ 0) for its known (white-listed agents) to ask their own known 
agents, namely agents included in their white lists (WL ≡ {Xk, … Xl}) and so on. Hence, the 
request message will be propagated in steps; each time an agent receives such a request forwards 
it to its well-behaved known agents, if it is allowed (TTL ≠ 0), reducing the TTL value by one. 
However, if the requesting agent is included in the black-list then its request message is ignored.  
Moreover, the TTL value acts as a termination condition so that messages are not 
propagated indefinitely in the MAS; whenever an agent receives a request message with zero 
TTL does not forward the message. Finally, each agent will return, following the reverse path of 
the request, both its ratings and those provided by its partners, which eventually will be received 
by the initial requesting agent A. The above rule-based framework is, actually, logic independent 
since it can be implement in any logic. Yet, in DISARM, we use defeasible logic, as already 
mentioned, for purposes of simplicity and efficiency.  
Rules r20-r24, below, model the above mentioned behavior. More specifically, rule r20 
initiates the ratings requests by sending it to all agents ?r in the white list, along with the TTL 
parameter. Rule r21 is responsible for answering back to the requesting agent about the requested 
agent’s rating is such a previous experience exists in the local knowledge base. Rule r22 is 
responsible for forwarding a received request to agents in the white list if the TTL is still positive, 
by decreasing it at the same time. Rule r23 is a defeater rule that defeats rules r22, namely it will 
block answering back to bad agents. Finally, rule r24 will store in the local knowledge base 
received ratings, is the sender is not in the blacklist. Notice that in this rule we use negation as 
failure, meaning that if BL(?s) fails during execution then not(BL(?s)) will succeed in order to 
determine if a sender agent does not belong to the blacklist. 
r20: send_message(sender→?self, receiver→?r, msg →request_reputation(about→?x,ttl→?t)) := 
 ttl_limit(?t), WL(?r), locate_ratings(about→?x). 
r21: send_message(sender→?self, receiver→?s,  
   msg →rating(id→rating’s_id, truster→ ?self, trustee→ ?x, t→time_stamp, 
response_time→value1, validity→value2, completeness→value3, 
  correctness→value4, cooperation→value5, outcome_feeling→value6,  
confidence→value7, transaction_value→value8)) := 
 receive_message(sender→?s, receiver→?self, msg →request_rating(about→?x,ttl→?t)), 
 rating(id→rating’s_id, truster→ ?self, trustee→ ?x, t→time_stamp, 
response_time→value1, validity→value2, completeness→value3, 
  correctness→value4, cooperation→value5, outcome_feeling→value6,  
confidence→value7, transaction_value→value8). 
r22: send_message(sender→?s, receiver→?r, msg →request_reputation(about→?x,ttl→?t1)):= 
 receive_message(sender→?s, receiver→?self, 
     msg →request_rating(about→?x,ttl→?t)), 
 ?t >0, WL(?r), ?t1 is ?t - 1. 
r23: ¬send_message(sender→?self, receiver→?s, msg →?m) :~ 
 send_message(sender→?self, receiver→?s, msg →?m), 
 BL(?s). 
r24: rating(id→rating’s_id, truster→ ?x, trustee→ ?y, t→time_stamp, 
response_time→value1, validity→value2, completeness→value3, 
correctness→value4, cooperation→value5, outcome_feeling→value6,  
confidence→value7, transaction_value→value8) := 
 receive_message(sender→?s, receiver→?self,  
   msg →rating(id→rating’s_id, truster→ ?x, trustee→ ?y, t→time_stamp, 
response_time→value1, validity→value2, completeness→value3, 
  correctness→value4, cooperation→value5, outcome_feeling→value6,  
confidence→value7, transaction_value→value8)), 
 not(BL(?s)). 
3.3.3 Discarding ratings 
As soon as, all available ratings are collected, an important decision has to be made; which 
ratings will be taken into account. Ratings represent the experience of the involved parties, which 
is distinguished to direct (agent’s direct experience PRX) and indirect experience. Indirect 
experience is divided in two categories, ratings provided by strangers (SRX) and reports provided 
by known agents due to previous interactions. In this context, r25 determines which agents are 
considered as known. Additionally to that, known agents are divided to three more categories; 
agents included in the WL white-list (WRX), agents included in the BL black-list (BRX) and the 
rest known agents (KRX). It is well known that using different opinions of a large group 
maximizes the possibility of crossing out unfair ratings. Hence, using both direct and indirect 
experience could lead to more truthful estimations.  
r25: known(agent→?x) :-  
  rating(id→?idx, truster→?self, trustee→?x). 
 However, sometimes one or more rating categories are missing, for instance, a newcomer 
has no personal experience and, thus, there are no available ratings (PRX). To this end, we wish to 
ground our conclusions in trust relationships that have been built and maintained over time, much 
as individuals do in real world. For instance, a user is much more likely to believe statements 
from a trusted acquaintance than from a stranger. Thus, personal opinion (PR) is more valuable 
than acquaintances opinion (KR), which in turn is more valuable than strangers’ opinion 
(SR).Furthermore, previously known and black-listed agents are generally considered unreliable 
than trusted agents (known agents or agents in the white-list) and, thus, they are ignored. Finally, 
agents in the white-list (WR) are usually more trusted than mere acquaintances (KR). In this 
context, the relationship among the rating categories is presented graphically in Fig. 1. 
 Fig. 1. Superiority relationship among rating categories. 
 In order to understand Fig. 1, the first level (top) suggests that all ratings count equally, 
whereas the fourth line (bottom), suggests an absolute preference to personal experience (PR), 
over whitelisted acquaintances (WR), over mere acquaintances (KR), and finally over strangers 
(SR). Thus, nodes on the left have precedence over nodes on the right. Furthermore, 
combinations of nodes from different levels can be made, provided that each rating source (PR, 
WR, KR, SR) is included only once. For example, one can combine node {PR, WR} from the 
third level with nodes {KR}, {SR} from the bottom level. This means that personal experience 
and experience of absolutely trusted acquaintances is treated equally, and both of them are 
preferred over ratings from mere acquaintances and over ratings from strangers. 
 As soon as the requesting agent A collects all the available ratings, it has to decide upon 
which of them will participate in the estimation. In order to do this, it has first to indicate which 
of them are eligible for participating in the final reputation value of agent X; namely a 
combination of four coefficients: RX = {PRX, WRX, KRX, SRX}. Hence, DISARM, as already 
discussed, uses confidence and transaction value in order to help agents to discard the collected 
ratings. Besides, it is important to take into account ratings that were made by confident trusters, 
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since their ratings are more likely to be right. Additionally, confident trusters, that were 
interacting in an important for them transaction, are even more likely to report truthful ratings. 
This assumption led to the following defeasible rules that define which ratings will be eligible for 
the reputation estimation and which not, according to the confidence and the transaction values, 
yet confidence and importance values are not involved in the estimation itself.  
r26: eligible_rating(rating→?idx, truster→?a, trustee→ ?x) :=  
  confidence_threshold(?conf), transaction_value_threshold(?tran),  
  rating(id→?idx, truster→?a, trustee→ ?x, 
    confidence→?confx, transaction_value→?tranx),  
  ?confx >= ?conf, ?tranx >= ?tran. 
r27: eligible_rating(rating→?idx, truster→?a, trustee→ ?x) :=   
  confidence_threshold(?conf), transaction_value_threshold(?tran), 
  rating(id→?idx, truster→?a, trustee→ ?x, 
   confidence→?confx, transaction_value→?tranx),  
  ?confx >= ?conf. 
r28: eligible_rating(rating→?idx, truster→?a, trustee→ ?x) :=   
  confidence_threshold(?conf), transaction_value_threshold(?tran), 
  rating(id→?idx, truster→?a, trustee→ ?x, 
   confidence→?confx, transaction_value→?tranx),  
  ?tranx >= ?tran. 
r26>r27>r28 
 To this end, rule r26 indicates that if both the truster’s confidence and transaction 
importance are high, according to the user’s threshold, then that rating will be eligible for the 
estimation process. Rule r27, on the other hand, indicates that even if the transaction value is 
lower than the threshold, it doesn’t matter so much if the truster’s confidence is high. Rule r28, 
finally, indicates that if there are only ratings with high transaction value then they should be 
eligible. In any other case, the rating should be omitted. Notice that the above rules are defeasible 
and they all conclude positive literals. However, these literals are conflicting each other, for the 
same pair of agents (truster and trustee), since we want in the presence e.g. of personal 
experience to omit strangers’ ratings. That’s why there is also a superiority relationship between 
the rules. The conflict set is formally determined as follows: 
C[eligible_rating(truster→?a, trustee→?x)] =  
  { ¬ eligible_rating(truster→?a, trustee→?x) } ∪  
  { eligible_rating(truster→?a1, trustee→?x1) | ?a ≠ ?a1 ∧ ?x ≠ ?x1 } 
 Moreover, even if it is defined which ratings are eligible, the final choice is up to the 
requesting agent A’s personal strategy. The criterion for this final choice, as already mentioned, 
is time. Other agents will prefer to take into account all eligible ratings whereas others will move 
one step further indicating which of the eligible ratings, e.g. the newest, will finally participate in 
the estimation. For instance, rules r29, r29’ and r29’’ are examples of such a decision; r29 indicates 
that given a time period (from date-time to date-time) then only rating in this interval will count, 
r29’ indicates that only the latest (from a specific time point onwards) will count whereas r29’’ 
indicates that only ratings reported back to a time window will count (where now() returns the 
current time point).    
r29: count_rating(rating→?idx, truster→?a, trustee→ ?x) :=  
  time_from_threshold(?ftime), time_to_threshold(?ttime),  
  rating(id→?idx, t→?tx, truster→?a, trustee→ ?x), 
  ?ftime <=?tx <= ?ttime. 
r29’: count_rating(rating→?idx, truster→?a, trustee→ ?x) :=  
  time_from_threshold(?ftime),  
  rating(id→?idx, t→?tx, truster→?a, trustee→ ?x),  
  ?ftime <=?tx. 
r29’’: count_rating(rating→?idx, truster→?a, trustee→ ?x) :=  
  time_window(?wtime),  
  rating(id→?idx, t→?tx, truster→?a, trustee→ ?x),  
  now() - ?wtime <=?tx. 
 DISARM, taking all the above into account, eventually categorizes the ratings (rules r30 to 
r33) into the previously defined categories and takes the final decision about which of the ratings 
can actually participate in the estimation process for the final reputation value RX (rules r34 to r36). 
r30: count_pr (rating→?id, trustee→?x) :- 
  eligible_rating(rating → ?id, truster→?self, trustee→ ?x),  
  count_rating(rating → ?id, truster→?self, trustee→ ?x).  
r31: count_wr (rating →?id, trustee→?x) :- 
  known(agent→?k), WL (trustee →?k), 
  eligible_rating(rating → ?id, truster→?k, trustee→ ?x),  
  count_rating(rating→?id, truster→?k, trustee→ ?x). 
r32: count_kr (rating →?id, trustee→?x) :- 
  known(agent→?k),  
  not(BL (trustee →?k)), not(WL (trustee →?k)), 
  eligible_rating(rating→?id, truster→?k, trustee→ ?x), 
  count_rating(rating→?id, truster→?k, trustee→ ?x).   
r33: count_sr (trustee→?x, rating→?id) :- 
  eligible_rating(rating → ?id, truster →?s, trustee→ ?x),  
  count_rating(rating → ?id, truster →?s, trustee→ ?x),  
  not(known(agent→?s)). 
 Rules r30 to r33, categorize the counted ratings in PRX (direct experience), WRX (known 
and trusted / white-listed witness), KRX (just known witness) and SRX (strangers’ witness), 
respectively. In r32 and r33, we use negation as failure. Specifically, in r32 if an agent ?k cannot be 
found both in the whitelist and the blacklist, it is considered as a known witness. Furthermore, in 
r33 if known() fails during execution then not(known()) will succeed, in order to determine which 
agents are considered totally strangers. Notice that the above rules are strict ones, i.e. their 
conclusions cannot be disputed. 
 The final decision making process for the RX is based on a relationship theory among the 
rating categories. In Fig. 1, we presented the complete relationship among all rating categories, 
whereas, below, we present three potential theories based on that relationship. In the first theory, 
all categories count, hence, if ratings from all of them are available (r34 to r37), then they will all 
participate in the final reputation estimation. To this end, if one of them is missing, then the other 
two are combined, whereas if just one category is available, then just that will be taken into 
account. This theory is equivalent to the first row in Fig. 1, namely the combination {PR, WR, 
KR, SR}. 
r34:  participate(trustee→?x, rating→?id) :=  
   count_pr(trustee→?x, rating→ ?id). 
r35:  participate(trustee→?x, rating→?id) :=  
  count_wr(trustee→?x, rating→ ?id). 
r36:  participate(trustee→?x, rating→?id) :=  
  count_kr(trustee→?x, rating→ ?id). 
r37:  participate(trustee→?x, rating→?id) :=  
  count_sr(trustee→?x, rating→ ?id). 
 In the rest two theories, opinions from different categories conflict each other (conflicting 
literals), therefore the conflict is being resolved via adding superiority relationships. Specifically, 
personal opinion is the most important, and then comes white-listed agents’ opinion, then simply 
known agents’ and then strangers’. We will present only the superiority relationships and we will 
not duplicate the rules. The conflict set (for both theories) is: 
C[participate(trustee→?x)] =  
  { ¬ participate(trustee→?x) } ∪  
  { participate(trustee→?x1) |?x ≠ ?x1 } 
 In the second theory, the priority relationship among the rules is based on the fact that an 
agent relies on its own experience if it believes it is sufficient, if not it acquires the opinions of 
others, much as do humans in real life. This theory is equivalent to the last row in Fig. 1, namely 
the combination {PR}, {WR}, {KR}, {SR}. 
r34>r35>r36>r37 
 In the third theory, on the other hand, if direct experience is available (PR), then it is 
preferred to be combined with ratings from well trusted agents (WR). On the other hand, if 
personal experience is not available, then ratings from well trusted agents is preferred over just 
known agents, which is preferred over ratings coming from strangers. In the end, if nothing of the 
above is available, DISARM acts as a pure witness system. This theory is equivalent to the 
combination of the first node of the third row in Fig. 1, with the two last nodes of the last row, 
namely the combination {PR, WR}, {KR}, {SR}. 
r34>r37, r34>r36, r35>r36, r35>r37, r36>r37 
3.3.4 Estimating Reputation 
Agent A eventually reaches on a decision upon which rating is going to participate in the 
estimation (RX = {PRX, WRX, KRX, SRX}), according to the chosen relationship theory, as 
discussed above. In this context, in order to cross out outliers, extremely positive or extremely 
negative values, the rating values are logarithmically transformed. Outliers are rating values that 
differ significantly from the mean (a central tendency) and, thus, they can have a large impact on 
the estimation process that could mislead agents. To this end, the most important feature of the 
logarithm is that, relatively, it moves big values closer together while it moves small values 
farther apart and, thus, rating data are better analyzed. More specifically, many statistical 
techniques work better with data that are single-peaked and symmetric while it is easier to 
describe the relationship between variables when it is approximately linear. Thus, when these 
conditions are not true in the original data, they can often be achieved by applying a logarithmic 
transformation. 
 To this end, each rating is normalized (r∈ [-1,1] | -1≡terrible, 1≡perfect), by using 10 as 
the logarithm base. Thus, the final reputation value ranges from -1 to +1, where -1, +1, 0 stand 
for absolutely negative, absolutely positive and neutral, respectively, which means that an agent’s 
reputation could be either negative or positive. Hence, the final reputation value RX is a function 
ℑ  that combines the transformed ratings for each available category: 
( ), , , (1)X X X XXR PR WR KR SR= ℑ  
 Moreover, since DISARM aims at simulating human behavior, it allows agents to 
determine what and how important is each rating parameter for them. In other words, an agent 
may consider validity more important than all, while it may not care at all about the outcome 
feeling of the interaction. An example could be the following: {response time→20%, 
validity→50%, completeness→10%, correctness→10%, cooperation→10%, outcome 
feeling→0%}. Hence, agents are allowed to provide specific weights (wi, i∈[1, 6]) that will 
indicate their personal preferences according the ratings’ coefficients. Formula 2, which is the 
modified Formula 1, calculates the weighted normalized values:  
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 Moving one step further, we try to understand deeper the relationship among the rating 
categories that participate in the estimation. It is up to the chosen relationship theory, presented in 
the previous subsection, which categories will participate, yet there is no clue about their 
percentage use in the estimation. To this end, in DISARM the user, through his/her agent A, is 
able to set what we call the “social trust weights” (πp, πw, πk, πs). These weights specify the 
balance between personal experience (πp) and witness reputation (πw, πk, πs). Hence, the final 
reputation value RX is calculated according to which experience is more important for the end 
user (Formula 3). 
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 Finally, since time is an important aspect in reputation, DISARM allows time not only to 
be used for discarding available ratings but also to be used in the estimation itself. It is generally 
accepted that more recent ratings “weigh” more since they represent the latest activity of a 
specific agent. In order to include this aspect in the final reputation value, each rating at time t 
(t<tnow) is multiplied with t itself, as shown below. So, time becomes a sort of weight; the larger 
(i.e. the most recent), the more it weighs. Hence, Formula 4 represents DISARM’s final metric. 
Moreover, mention that a potential example of this formula, the simplest one for functionℑ , 
could be the summation; in the sense that all categories participate additively in the final value, 
each one with its own weight. 
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3.3.5 Measuring estimation confidence 
As already mentioned, DISARM also studies the variability of the ratings that were finally taken 
into account as a measure about the confidence of the estimation itself. For this purpose, we use 
standard deviation. It measures the amount of variation or dispersion from the average. Yet, in 
addition to expressing the variability of a population, the standard deviation is commonly used to 
measure confidence in statistical conclusions. In other words, the standard deviation is a measure 
of how spread out numbers are. A low standard deviation indicates that the data points (here 
ratings) tend to be very close to the mean, the expected value, hence it is more likely the 
estimation to be closer to the agent’s actual behavior. On the other hand, a high standard 
deviation indicates that the data points (ratings) are spread out over a large range of values and, 
thus, it is difficult to predict the agent’s behavior. Formula 5 presents the standard deviation 
metric used in DISARM, where N represents the total amount of used (in formula 4) ratings (r). 
2
1
1 ( ( )) , ,
_ ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  
N
coefficient coefficient coefficient coefficient coefficient coefficient coefficient
X X X X X X X
j
r r r pr wr kr sr
N
coefficient response time validity completeness correctness cooperation outcom
σ µ
=
= − ∈ ∪ ∪ ∪
=
∑
{ }( )_ 5e feeling
 
 More specifically, in DISARM the above formula does not participate in the estimation 
process itself nor affect, in any way, the reputation value. Its role is to act complement to 
DISARM’s final metric (formula 4), in order to indicate the probability the estimated value 
(formula 4) to be close to reality. The motivation behind the use of the standard deviation formula 
(formula 5) was the fact that although reputation models provide an estimated reputation value 
they do not provide any clue about how likely is this estimation to reflect the agent’s true 
behavior. To this end, DISARM provides an additional tool (formula 5) in order to assist agents, 
and thus their users, to make the best for them choices. 
4 Evaluation 
For evaluation purposes, regarding DISARM, we combined two testbed environments, adopted 
from [21, 20], previously used in [27], and [24]. These testbeds are quite similar, just with slight 
differences in number of participants and simulation rounds. In this context, we preserved the 
testbed design but slightly changed the evaluation settings, taking into account the data provided 
in previous works. Below, a description of the testbed is given, and next the methodology and the 
experimental settings for our experiments are also presented. The testbed environment is a multi-
agent system consisting of agents providing services and agents that use these services. We 
assume that the performance of a provider, and effectively its trustworthiness, is independent 
from the service that is provided. In order to reduce the complexity of the testbed’s environment, 
it is assumed that there is only one type of service in the testbed and, as a result, all the providers 
offer the same service.  
Nevertheless, the performance of the providers, such as the quality of the service in terms 
of satisfaction, response time, etc., differs and determines the utility that a consumer gains from 
each interaction (called UG≡utility gain). The value of UG varies from 0 to 10 and it depends on 
the level of performance of the provider in that interaction. A provider agent can serve many 
users at a time. After an interaction, the consumer agent rates the service of the provider based on 
the level of performance and the quality of the service it received. It is assumed that all agents 
exchange their information honestly in this testbed. This means an agent (as a witness) provides 
its true ratings as they are without any modification. Each agent interaction is a simulation round. 
Events that take place in the same round are considered simultaneous and, thus, the round number 
is used as the time stamp for events and ratings.  
 In this context, for implementation purposes, we use EMERALD [28], a framework for 
interoperating knowledge-based intelligent agents in the Semantic Web. This framework is built 
on top of JADE [4], a reliable and widely used multi-agent framework. EMERALD was chosen 
since it provides a safe, generic, and reusable framework for modeling and monitoring agent 
communication and agreements. Moreover, it proposes, among others, the use of Reasoners [29]. 
Reasoners are agents that offer reasoning services to the rest of the agent community. A Reasoner 
can launch an associated reasoning engine, in order to perform inference and provide results. 
EMERALD supports a number of Reasoners but most important for the purposes of this article 
are the four Reasoners that use defeasible reasoning; among them is the DR-Reasoner (based on 
DR-Device defeasible logic system [3]), the defeasible Reasoner that was used for the evaluation. 
Additionally, EMERALD provides an advanced yellow paper service, called AYPS, that is 
responsible for recording and representing information related to registered in the environment 
agents, namely their name, type, registration time and activity. This information is dynamically 
stored in the AYPS agent’s database. Hence, the service is able to retrieve up-to-date information 
at any time. 
 Hence, even if DISARM, or any other distributed model, is a distributed reputation 
model, agents that use it are able to send requests to AYPS in order to get first a list of potential 
partners. Next, they will use the DISARM model in order to estimate reputation for one or more 
of them in order to find the most appropriate partner. Of course, it is not necessary to use such 
services; it is up to each agent’s personal strategy how it will locate potential partners. The more 
an agent knows the environment, the better it can choose providers and, thus, the more utility 
gains. In this context, agents in the environment are free to ask others for their opinion (ratings), 
hence each agent requests the service from the most trustworthy and reliable provider according 
to it. Furthermore, concerning DISARM’s final metric (formula 4), in this section we adopt the 
addition as shown below: 
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To this end, taking all the above into account, the testbed in each experiment is populated 
with provider and consumer agents. Each consumer agent is equipped with a particular trust 
model (a centralized approach is also included), which helps it select a provider when it needs to 
use a service. The only difference among consumer agents is the trust models that they use, so the 
utility gained by each agent through simulations will reflect the performance of its trust model in 
selecting reliable providers for interactions. As a result, the testbed records the UG of each 
interaction with each trust model used. Consumer agents without the ability to choose a trust 
model will randomly select a provider from the list. Furthermore, in order to obtain an accurate 
result for performance comparisons between trust models, each one will be employed by a large 
but equal number of consumer agents. 
Table 1. Testbed environment. 
 
Density in the 
environment 
 Density in the 
environment 
Service Providers  Service Consumers  
Good providers 15% DISARM 14.28% 
Ordinary providers 30% Social Regret 14.28% 
Intermittent providers 15% Certified Reputation 14.28% 
Bad providers 40% CRM 14.28% 
  FIRE 14.28% 
  HARM 14.28% 
  NONE 14.28% 
 
Hence, Table 1 displays the testbed environment; the four types of service providers used, 
namely good, ordinary, bad and fickle (or intermittent). The first three provide services according 
to the assigned mean value of quality with a small range of deviation. Fickle agents, on the other 
hand, cover all possible outcomes randomly. Finally, in this section, we compare DISARM, 
Social Regret, Certified Reputation, CRM, FIRE, HARM [27] and NONE (no trust mechanism, 
randomly selected providers). We used HARM although it is a centralized approach since it is a 
rule-based model using temporal defeasible reasoning. In this context, taking into account all the 
available data, Fig 2 depicts the overall ranking regarding the utility gained for all models, even 
for absence of model, namely NONE (random selection). 
 
Fig. 2. Mean Utility Gained Ranking. 
As shown in Fig. 2 NONE performance is poor and, as expected, consistently the lowest. 
HARM, on the other hand, is consistently the highest. This is not surprising since HARM is a 
rule-based, centralized model. Hence, it is able to gather ratings about all interactions in the 
system as opposed to the rest distributed models, where locating rating is a challenging task by 
itself. This allows agents using HARM to achieve higher performance right from the first 
interactions. Concerning, the distributed models, it is clear that DISARM, Certified Reputation 
and Social Regret gain a quite high UG value, yet they unable to reach the performance of 
centralized models like HARM. Among distributed models, DISARM achieves a slight high 
performance, mainly due to the fact that it is using a dynamic (defeasible) reputation estimation 
mechanism that enables agents to take more intuitive decisions and, thus, increase their 
performance. Furthermore, DISARM enables agents to get familiarized with the environment 
faster as opposed to CRM and FIRE which, as shown in Fig. 2, need more time to know the 
environment and stabilize their performance. 
 
Fig. 3. Storage space grow. 
Although, centralized models achieve higher UG score they have significant limitations in 
terms of execution time and storage space. This is not surprising since centralized models are, 
usually, managed by a single agent. This manager has to store all ratings in the system, which are 
increased over time, and to respond to an increasing number of requests, leading to bottle-neck 
effect. On the other hand, distributed models store just their own ratings and those obtained by 
witnesses which are far less than the whole available ratings in the system. Additionally, these 
extra witness ratings could be erased after use, releasing space. As shown in Fig. 3, HARM, 
being a centralized model, needs much more space than distributed models, reaching even the 
double. On the other hand, models like DISARM and Social Regret that take into account social 
aspects, need less space, even from other distributed approaches, since they collect less ratings. 
Hence, the more ratings used by a model the more space (and usually time) is needed. 
5 Related Work 
Trust and reputation represent a significant aspect in modern multi-agent systems. An interesting 
and very challenging active research area is already focused on them; various models and metrics 
have already been proposed in order to deal with the challenging decision making processes in 
the agent community [17, 15, 37]. Reputation is used to build trust among agents, minimizing the 
risk involved in the transactions and increasing users’ confidence and satisfaction. Hence, since 
the best decisions are those that taken under the minimum risk, trust and reputation models 
support agents to take promising decisions regarding potential partners.  
To this end, one of the first, if not the first, model that used the idea of witness reputation 
was a decentralized trust model, called Regret [47, 45]. Regret is, actually, one of the most 
representative trust and reputation models in multi-agent systems. It combines witness reports 
and direct interaction experience in order to provide reputation values. Additionally, in Regret 
ratings are dealt with respect to time; old ratings are given less importance compared to new 
ones. An evolution of Regret, a primary attempt to locate witnesses’ ratings, called Social Regret 
[46], was also presented by the authors. Social Regret is a reputation system oriented to e-
commerce environments that incorporates the notion of social graph. More specifically, Social 
Regret groups agents with frequent interactions among them and considers each one of these 
groups as a single source of reputation values. In this context, only the most representative agent 
within each group is asked for information. To this end, a heuristic is used in order to find groups 
and to select the best agent to ask.  
Social Regret, similarly to DISARM, is one of the rare cases that the social dimension of 
agents is taken into account. Yet, Social Regret does not reflect the actual social relations among 
agents, like DISARM, but rather attempts to heuristically reduce the number of queries to be 
done in order to locate ratings. Taking into account the opinion of only one agent of each group is 
a severe disadvantage since the most agents are marginalized, distorting reality. However, both 
Regret and DISARM recognize the importance of time and take into account both personal and 
witness ratings. Yet, only DISARM allows agents to decide on their own about what they 
consider important regarding time. Additionally, only DISARM provides a knowledge-based 
mechanism, promoting a nonmonotonic, more flexible, human-like approach. 
Another popular distributed model is FIRE [21]. FIRE integrates four types of trust and 
reputation, namely interaction trust, role-based trust, witness reputation and certified reputation. 
Interaction trust and witness reputation are, as in DISARM, an agent’s past experience from 
direct interactions and reports provided by witnesses about an agent’s behavior, respectively. 
Role-based trust, on the other hand, is trust defined by various role-based relationships between 
the agents whereas certified reputation is third-party references provided by the target agents. The 
aforementioned values are combined into a single measure by using the weighted mean method. 
FIRE similar to DISARM recognizes the need for hybrid models that will take into account more 
than one source for the final reputation estimation. Yet, although FIRE take into account more 
sources than DISARM, it uses a weak computation model for the final combination and 
reputation estimation. DISARM, on the other hand, provides a human-like knowledge-based 
mechanism, based on defeasible logic that let agents take into account the most promising 
available rating in order to predict the future behavior of a potential partner. Additionally, only 
DISARM takes in account the social dimension of multi-agent systems with respect to time. 
Another remarkable reputation model is Certified Reputation [20], a decentralized 
reputation model, like DISARM, involving each agent keeping a set of references given to it from 
other agents. In this model, each agent is asked to give certified ratings of its performance after 
every transaction. The agent then chooses the highest ratings and stores them as references. Any 
other agent can then ask for the stored references and calculate the agent’s certified reputation. 
This model overcomes the problem of initial reliability in a similar way with DISARM. 
However, opposed to our approach, this model is designed to determine the access rights of 
agents, rather than to determine their expected performance. Furthermore, it is a witness-based 
model, whereas DISARM combines both witnesses and direct experience, providing a rule-based 
methodology to deal with the discrimination issue. Furthermore, although in Certified Reputation 
agents are freed from the various costs involved in locating witness reports, such as resource, 
time and communication costs, ratings might be misquoted since it is each agent’s responsibility 
to provide ratings about itself and in the fact the best ones. 
TRR (Trust–Reliability–Reputation) trust model [44] allows a software agent to represent 
both the reliability and the reputation of another agent, merging finally these measures into a 
global trust evaluation. It uses a dynamically computed weight that represents how an agent 
considers important the reliability with respect to the reputation when it computes the trust of 
another agent. Yet, the weight depends on the number of interactions between the two agents, 
which is actually a problem when these agents have no interaction history. Hence, TRR provides 
a mechanism for estimating the global reputation value of an agent based on previous 
interactions. On the other hand, DISARM provides a knowledge-based mechanism that enables 
each agent to estimate a personalized reputation based on its preferences. Moreover, DISARM 
takes into account plenty of issues, such as time and social relations, although it does not deal 
with reliability issues as TRR does. Additionally, DISARM is a nonmonotonic approach based 
on defeasible logic that provides a more flexible, human-like approach that enables agents not 
only to estimate a reputation value but also to decide upon their relationships in the community.  
 CRM (Comprehensive Reputation Model) [24] is another typical distributed reputation 
model. In CRM the ratings used to assess the trustworthiness of a particular agent can either be 
obtained from an agent’s interaction history or collected from other agents that can provide their 
suggestions in the form of ratings; namely interaction trust and witness reputation, respectively. 
CRM is a probabilistic-based model, taking into account the number of interactions between 
agents, the timely relevance of provided information and the confidence of reporting agents on 
the provided data. More specifically, CRM, first, takes into account direct interactions among 
agents, calling the procedure online trust estimation. After a variable interval of time, the actual 
performance of the evaluated agent is compared against the information provided by other agents 
in a procedure called off-line. Off-line procedure considers the communicated information to 
judge the accuracy of the consulting agents in the previous on-line trust assessment process. In 
other words, in CRM the trust assessment procedure is composed of on-line and off-line 
evaluation processes. Both CRM and DISARM acknowledge the need for hybrid reputation 
models taking into account time issues, yet they propose a starkly opposite approach. 
Additionally, both models use a confidence parameter in order to weight ratings more accurately. 
However, DISARM takes into account a variety of additional parameters, allowing users to 
define weights about them. As a result, more accurate and personalized estimations are provided. 
Furthermore, only DISARM considers the social relations among agents providing a 
nonmonotonic approach that let them establish and maintain trust relationships, locating quite 
easily reliable ratings. 
Finally, HARM [27], a previous work of us, is a hybrid rule-based reputation model that uses 
temporal defeasible logic in order to combine interaction trust and witness reputation. Yet, it is a 
centralized approach which actually overcomes the difficulty to locate witness reports. DISARM, 
on the other, hand is also a hybrid but distributed model that uses defeasible (yet not temporal) 
logic in a similar point of view. Actually, DISARM is an updated and extended model based 
partially on HARM’s principles though adapting a decentralized approach. To this end, although 
both models consider time important, they are dealing with it with a totally different approach. 
Ratings in HARM are characterized by a time offset property, which indicates the time instances 
that should pass in order to consider each rating active while each of them counts only for a 
limited time duration. DISARM uses the time itself in the final estimation formula, letting agents 
to use a similar to human thinking philosophy that first decides upon which category of rating 
should be taken into account and then discards ratings included there. Comparing, these two 
models, we believe that DISARM and HARM, despite their similarities and differences, are two 
nonmonotonic models that enable agents to improve their effectiveness and intuitiveness in a way 
more related to the traditional human reasoning for assessing trust in the physical word. 
6 Conclusions and Future Work 
This article presented DISARM, a social, distributed, hybrid, rule-based reputation model which 
uses defeasible logic. DISARM though appropriate rules, combines interaction trust and witness 
reputation. Moreover, it limits the common disadvantages of the existing distributed trust 
approaches, such as locating ratings, by considering the agents acting in the environment as a 
social network. Hence, each agent is able to propagate its requests in the rest community, locating 
quite fast ratings from previously known and well-rated agents. Additionally, DISARM’s 
mechanism is based on defeasible logic, modeling the way intelligent agents, like humans, draw 
reasonable conclusions from inconclusive information, which is one of the main advantages of 
the model. Actually, it is one of the first models that use nonmonotonic knowledge, in the form of 
defeasible logic in order to predict agents’ future behavior. It is based on well-established 
estimation parameters [8, 9], such as information correctness, completeness, and validity, agent’s 
response time and cooperation, as well as outcome feeling of the interaction. Hence, DISARM 
can be adopted in any multi-agent system in the Semantic Web, such as JADE and EMERALD. 
Finally, we provided an evaluation that illustrates the usability of the proposed model. 
 As for future directions, first of all, we plan to study further DISARM’s performance by 
comparing it to more reputation models from the literature and use it in real-world applications, 
combining it also with Semantic Web metadata for trust [10, 11]. Another direction is towards 
improving DISARM. There are still some open issues and challenges regarding, for instance, 
rating locating. More technologies could be adopted for these purpose; ontologies, machine 
learning techniques and user identity recognition and management are some of them.  
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